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ABSTRACT. We propose a mechanism to implement the distributional goal of “specific 
egalitarianism”, or that allocation of a good be independent of income, but increasing in 
relative strength of preference or need.  Governments could offer the good at multiple 
“outlets” that charge different money and time prices.  Individuals would self-select 
between outlets based on time opportunity cost.  We show conditions under which 
differential pricing achieves specific egalitarianism more efficiently than uniform 
public provision funded from income tax, with or without optional private purchase.  
Differential pricing becomes more efficient than uniform provision as 1) the relative 
importance of the good rises, 2) the elasticity of substitution between goods falls, 3) 
variation in preferences increases and 4) income inequality rises or the proportion of the 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
  Economists have traditionally been wary of distributional concerns over private 
goods, or of publicly providing private goods for redistributive purposes.  It has 
commonly been argued that distributional concerns grounded in utilitarian social 
welfare could be met at least cost by transferring income from rich to poor, and then 
allowing market prices to allocate resources to their most valued uses (the Second 
Welfare Theorem).  Nevertheless, two factors have increased the attention economists 
have paid to in-kind provision over the past thirty years.   
  First, good-specific distributional concerns, particularly over items “essential to 
life and citizenship,” have proven remarkably robust over time (Tobin, 1970).   For 
example, compulsory public health insurance in Canada, implemented federally in 
1968, was reviewed in 2002 and justified in part on the basis that Canadians want the 
poor to have the same access to health care as the rich (Romanow Commission, 2002, 
p. xvi).  The enduring popularity of the Food Stamp program in the United States has 
ensured its survival through welfare reform, prompting some economists to suggest that 
good-specific distributional concerns be taken seriously as a public policy objective 
(Tobin, (1970),Weitzman (1977), and Rosen (2002a, p. 175)).     
  Second, the incorporation of imperfect information into public economics has 
shown that egalitarian in-kind provision of some types of goods can actually increase 
utilitarian social welfare.  Goods such as health insurance may not be available to all in 
private markets if providers cannot distinguish high and low risk individuals 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).  Similarly, governments may be unable to distinguish 
high from low ability workers, and thus face restrictions on the degree of income 
redistribution possible through optimally designed tax systems. For individuals with 
high ability may mimic those with low ability in order to avoid taxes or qualify for cash 
  2 
 transfers (Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Boadway and Marchand (1995), and 
Blomquist and Christiansen (1995)).  These authors have used unknown risk or ability 
to explore conditions where social welfare would be higher if certain private goods 
were publicly provided at a uniform level to all.    
  In this paper, we are agnostic as to the basis for good-specific egalitarianism, or 
the domain of goods to which it might apply.  Instead we ask how such a distributional 
concern could be achieved at least cost in efficiency.  The good in question could be as 
major as health care, or minor as access to popular national park sites, though we 
restrict our attention to goods for which resale is infeasible. We propose a differential 
pricing mechanism, where the government could make the target good available at 
“outlets” charging different time and money price combinations.  By appropriately 
choosing the money price of the good across outlets, the government can ensure that 
individuals self-select outlets by their earnings ability.  Individuals of each ability level 
will purchase the same quantity of the target good on average, while those who value 
the target good more relative to other goods will purchase more of it than those who 
value it less. 
  Of course, any use of time as an allocation device involves the waste of an 
otherwise valuable resource.  There is then inescapably an efficiency cost to our 
proposed form of differential pricing.  We show, however, that the cost of achieving 
specific egalitarianism may be less under our proposal than under more conventional 
instruments, such as uniform public provision funded by proportional income tax, with 
or without private purchase.   In particular, differential pricing is likely to be more 
efficient than tax-funded uniform provision as 1) the relative importance of the target 
good in people’s utilities rises, 2) the elasticity of substitution between the target good 
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 and other goods falls, 3) heterogeneity of preference for the target good increases and 
4) income inequality rises or the proportion of the poor falls.       
  The layout of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on the distributional and efficiency aspects of queuing as an allocation 
mechanism.  Section 3 provides a formal model of our allocation mechanism.  Section 
4 compares social welfare under this mechanism with tax funded uniform provision.  
We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2.  Equitably Inefficient Queues
1
  Allocating goods that are “essential to life and citizenship” using queues is often 
seen as fairer than using price because time is more evenly distributed than income 
(Nichols et al. (1971), Barzel (1974), O’Shaughnessy (2000), and Alexeev and Leitzel 
(2001)).  Yet allocating goods by time rather than price creates two major costs in 
efficiency.  First, buyers who wait in line are surrendering a valuable resource, time, 
that unlike money does not get transferred to the seller.  The opportunity cost of that 
lost time may be leisure, but also forgone production. Thus, widespread queuing for 
goods in an economy would ultimately make fewer of these goods available.  Second, 
the time price of queuing penalizes those with a higher opportunity cost of time.  When 
compared to pricing, queuing will thus transfer goods from some who value them more 
to others who value them less (Tobin (1970), Suen (1989), and O’Shaugnessy (2000)).  
This is why economists have generally recommended meeting distributional concerns 
at a general level with a tax and transfer system, and then allocating private goods by 
price, or congestible public services with user fees set at marginal social cost (Rosen 
(2002b)). 
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   On the other hand, tax and transfer systems carry their own distortions in work 
disincentives (Tobin (1970) and Bucovetsky (1984)) and imperfect targeting of the 
truly needy vs. the opportunistic (Alexeev and Leitzel (2001)).  Similarly, user fees for 
congestible public services may have regressive distributional effects (Nichols et al. 
(1971)).  In response, a number of studies have compared the efficiency of alternative 
re-distributional instruments, such as tax/transfers, in-kind transfers, queuing, or 
rationing with resale (Bucovetsky (1984), Sah (1987), Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1988), Polterovich (1993), O’Shaugnessy (2000) and Alexeev and Leitzel (2001).  In 
general, when re-sale is not practical, the inefficiency of queuing must be traded-off 
against the inefficiency of allocating uniform quantities of a good to heterogeneous 
people.        
  Our approach begins with a key insight by Nichols et al. (1971) that if people 
could  choose whether to pay by money or by time, much of the re-distributional 
potential of queuing could be preserved, and its inefficiency reduced.  Indeed, private 
firms with a degree of monopoly power commonly offer goods with a variety of price / 
wait combinations as a form of second degree price discrimination to increase profits 
(Tirole (1988)).  Governments could do the same with a target good, but to pursue 
distributional ends such as specific egalitarianism.  Low wage individuals would self-
select to pay partly by (low) price and partly by time, while those with a high wage 
would self-select to pay only by money.  If wage captures the opportunity cost of time, 
and differences in wages reflect differences in marginal product, then the time lost in 
queues would have low foregone cost in wages and production.  The costly and error-
prone apparatus of means testing individuals would be unnecessary.  Nichols et al. 
provided no formal model of differential pricing, but O’Shaugnessy (2000) and 
Alexeev and Leitzel (2001)) do when comparing social welfare under such a system 
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 with that under conventional tax and transfer systems.   Both of the latter studies 
assume, however, that preferences are identical across the population.  They also model 
economies in which only a single good is produced, and thus eligible for redistribution.  
     Though independently derived, we formalize the differential pricing mechanism 
proposed by Nichols et al. and show that it can make consumption of any particular 
good independent of income, but dependent on relative strength of preference or need.  
We then illustrate conditions under which it can do this with greater efficiency than 
public uniform provision, with or without allowance for private purchase. 
   
3.  A Model of Redistribution through Differential Pricing 
  Consider an economy of   people who have constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) preference orderings over leisure  , a composite commodity 
N
l y , and a “target” 
good g whose distribution is of concern to a policy maker.
2  While each individual 
values g, some have a stronger preference (or need) for it relative to and y than others.    l
  ()
1
(,,) i Uy g y g
ρρ ρ ρ θ =+ + ll   i = R or S              (1) 
i θ  represents this relative strength of preference for the target good (“strong” or 
“regular”), where  S θ > R θ .  ρ (<1) represents the individual’s elasticity of substitution 
between the target good and other goods, and could range from almost perfect 
flexibility (ρ → 1), to Cobb Douglas (ρ = 0), to Leontief (ρ  → −∞).     
  Individuals earn income from their choice of labour hours L, which they spend 
at competitive firms producing either Y or G.
3  Workers are paid a wage equal to the 
value of their marginal product.  We assume for simplicity that production technology 
is identical in the Y and G sectors, and that an individual’s marginal product is the same 
at both.  Income inequality arises in part because of differences in taste ( i θ ), but mostly 
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 because of differences in ability. NH of N workers have a high ability and marginal 
product, and so receive a high wage  H w .  The remaining NL workers (= N-NH) have a 
low ability, marginal product, and wage  .   Workers of high and low ability divide 
their labour hours between production sectors according to 
L w
, iH L =  ,
G
iH L  + 
,
Y
iH L  and 
, iL L = 
,
G
iL L  + 
,
Y
iL L  respectively, where i = R or S.   
  The prices individuals face are as follows.  The price of leisure is a person’s 
wage, wj ( j = L or H), while the price of y is normalized to 1.  Under the mechanism 
we propose, the full money and time price of the target good g at a given outlet is Pg,j = 
wjh + p, where p is the money price per unit, and h is the hours of waiting time required 
per unit.
4  With these prices and income, each person faces a budget constraint 
. Individuals also face a time constraint, as they have an (identical) time 
endowment T that can be spent working L, in leisure ℓ, or in line (hg).  As is easily 
shown in Appendix 1, individuals will choose the g outlet offering the lowest full price 
given their opportunity cost of time w
j wL p g y =+
j.  Conditional on this choice of outlet, an 
individual’s problem is:    
            ()
1/
,, i yg MaxU y g
ρ ρρ ρ θ =+ +
l l     
 s.t.    j pg y w L + = ,                  ( 2 )  
  L hg T ++ = l           where i=R or S and  j = L or H. 
     
With interior solutions for any ρ ∈ (-∞,1), the corresponding demand functions are: 
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,   i=R or S, and  j = L or H. 
Substituting demands into utility yields an individual’s indirect utility function: 
 
** *




, (1 ) gj i j j Pw w T
ρρ ρ ρ
ρρ ρ ρ ρ θ
−
−− − − ++ θ =+ + l  =    
     i=R or S, and  j = L or H          (4) 
Note from (3) or (4) that individuals with a given wage are indifferent as to the 
composition of g’s full price, Pg,j, between the time (h) and money (p) components.  
  Firms operate in perfectly competitive markets, producing either Y or G  by 
employing workers with both ability levels and tastes  using constant returns 
technology.  With constant (exogenous) marginal products and price of y set to one, 
wages adjust to equal marginal product, and so the price of both leisure and y are 
determined.  With identical technology in the G sector as in Y, the competitive price of 
g without re-distribution would equal that of y, 1. 
    Under  our  mechanism,  however,  the policy maker would purchase all G 
produced by firms at cost, and sell it at a higher money price pH > 1 at one outlet, and at 
a lower money price  L p  at a second outlet.
5  Note that the low price L p  could even be 
set negative, functioning as a unit subsidy funded from the tax at the high price outlet. 
Separation of buyers by wage will occur if members of each wage group find the full 
price at their own outlet lower than at the alternative, given their opportunity cost of 
time.  By choosing the money price at each outlet, the policy maker could seek to 
maximize social welfare subject to “specific egalitarianism,” or that 
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   1.  consumption of g be equalized across the average low and high wage          
       person, yet 
  2.  individuals with a strong preference or need for g receive as much or more of 
       it than individuals with a relatively weak preference, regardless of income. 
 
We have set the requirement that consumption of g be weakly rather than strictly 
increasing in strength of preference, in order to permit comparison of our mechanism 
with more conventional redistributive instruments such as uniform provision.  As we 
shall see, differential pricing can satisfy the stricter requirement.    
To formally model the policy maker’s problem, we describe finally the 
distribution of strong and regular tastes for g among ability groups.  We denote by 
0≤s≤1  the proportion of individuals with a strong preference θS for g, and assume 
initially that it is the same among low and high wage individuals.  We discuss the 
relaxation of this assumption in the final section of the paper.  
  The policy maker’s formal problem is:  
,, , ,,, (1 ) (1 )
HH LL
LR L LS L HR H HS H phph , Max SW s N V sN V s N V sN V =− + +− +           (5) 
 
 subject  to 
            ( 6 a )  
** * *
,, , (1 ) (1 ) RL SL RH SH sg s g sg s g −+ = −+ ,
  ,  ,                        (6b) 
**
,, Sj Rj gg ≥
**
,, SL RH gg ≥
**
,, SH RL gg ≥
 (1 ) ( 1) H HL L p Np −= − N                 ( 7 )  
  , g HH L Pw h ≤+ L p                                       (8a) 
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             ( 8 b )
   =   
          (9) 
** *
,, , (1 ) (1 ) L RL L SL H RH H SH sNg s Ng sN g s N g −+ + − +
,, , (1 ) (1 )
GG G
L L RL L L SL H H RH H H SH sNwL s NwL sN wL s N wL −+ + − +
 
Constraints (6a) and (6b) define specific egalitarianism as described above.  Constraint 
(7) is a reduced form of the policy maker’s balanced budget condition, where the right- 
and left hand side of (6a) have cancelled.  Equations (8a) and (8b) are incentive 
compatibility constraints for low and high ability individuals to remain at their own 
outlets.  Finally, (9) is the economy’s resource constraint for the supply and demand for 
g.
6
  We characterize the solution to this problem in steps.  First, the expression for   
pH  in the balanced budget condition (7) can be substituted into the specific 
egalitarianism constraint (6a).  The money price pL that satisfies (6a) can be expressed 
as an implicit function of hL and hH, as then from (7) can pH.  Pg,H and Pg,L in social 
welfare (5) can then be expressed using these implicit functions of hL and  hH. 






(1 ( ( , , , , , , , )) )
HL
gj L H j i j i j j hh
iR SjL H
SW P h h s w T N w w T
ρρ ρ






  (10) 
  Next, we show that social welfare as expressed in (10) is unambiguously falling 
in both high and low wage queuing times.   So a planner will maximize (10) by setting 
both hH and hL as low as possible, subject to meeting separation constraints (8a) and 
(8b).   First, given some optimal queuing time at the high ability outlet, hH
*, we claim 
SW will fall in hL.  This is because as hL rises, the full price at the low ability outlet 
must also rise.  Why?  Pg,L could remain constant or fall only if the money price pL fell, 
which from budget balance (7) would require the policy maker to raise pH.  From (6a), a 
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 higher pH given hH
* would reduce demand for g among those with high ability.  To 
satisfy egalitarianism, this would have to be matched with a drop in demand by those 
with low ability, which cannot occur if  Pg,L has fallen or remained constant.  Thus, a 
rise in  hL must raise Pg,L, lower the indirect utility of low ability individuals, and so 
lower social welfare.  hL
* will thus be set at the minimum level consistent with keeping 
the low wage outlet unattractive to those with a high wage, or from (8a), hL =(Pg,H – 
pL)/wH.  Unfortunately, we can show from the numerator that this time price will have 
to be positive.  This follows because Pg,H must exceed Pg,L for (6a) to be satisfied, since 
it can be shown that   and  / , gw ij j ∂∂ > 0 0 / ,, gP ij gj ∂ ∂< .  Yet Pg,H cannot exceed 
Pg,L if hL ≤ 0, since setting it minimally implies Pg,H = wHhL + pL ≤ wLhL + pL = Pg,L. 
  Conversely, given an optimal hL
*, social welfare will also be falling in hH, for 
the analogous reason that when hH  rises, the full price Pg,H  must also rise, lowering the 
indirect utility of high wage individuals.  But unlike for low wage individuals, there 
need be no queuing at the high wage outlet.  Setting hH = 0 will still satisfy (8b), or that  
pH ≥ Pg,L, because (8a) becomes wHhL
* + pL = Pg,H = pH, which exceeds wLhL
* + pL = 
Pg,L.  In short, hH
* =0, and hL
* can be re-expressed as (pH – pL)/wH. 
  Substituting these requirements for optimal queuing times into the resource 
constraint (9), the technical conditions are satisfied to ensure there exist unique money 
prices  pH  and pL that the policy maker can choose to ensure a feasible allocation.
7  
  The reader may gain intuition concerning the planner’s optimal pricing policy 
*** * {, ,, } H hL L phph from Figure 1.  The figure illustrates the time/money price pairs for g 
that would yield the same full price for high wage individuals, including the socially 
optimal pair at point A, where hH
* = 0 and pH
*
 .  It also shows the time/money price pairs 
that would yield low wage individuals the same full price, including the optimal pair at  
p (money        A             
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8  The optimal time/money prices at points A and B are incentive 
compatible, in that no individual from either wage group would be better off by going 
to the outlet targeted to the other.  Yet inefficiency is minimised by making the least 
use of time pricing possible.   
  While we have constructed our optimal policy to make consumption of g 
equalized between wage groups (6a), we have not yet shown that it will be increasing in 
relative strength of preference, or (6b).   For a given wage group at a given outlet, it can 
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Thus, within an outlet,  .  Furthermore, since the pricing solution must satisfy 
(6a), average demand must be equalized across outlets, say at g
*






*.  It follows that at the 
low wage outlet, for any distribution of s, .  Similarly, for any 
distribution of s at the high wage outlet, .  Combining the two, an 
individual with a high need for g will always purchase an above average amount at his 
**
, RL SL gg g <<
** *
, RH SH gg g <<
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 outlet, while an individual with a low need for g will always purchase a below average 
amount.  Or formally,   and  , so that (6b) is strictly and therefore 
weakly satisfied .      
**




, SH RL gg >
  Once the policy maker has determined the optimal prices, the total quantity of G 
that will be sold at each outlet follows easily, and thus the total quantity that must be 
purchased from the G production sector.  G will need to be allocated to each outlet in 
proportion to the distribution of ability types in the population.  Our assumption of 
identical, constant returns technology in the G and Y production sectors means that the 
precise allocation of individuals’ labour hours across the two  sectors is under-
identified.
9  See Appendix 2 for details.      
  Our characterization of the differential pricing mechanism for in-kind 
redistribution is complete.  By commanding exclusive purchase rights over a target 
good and setting a high money price at one outlet, and a low money price with queue at 
another, a policy maker can ensure that consumption of the good is equalized across 
wage groups, while increasing in relative need.  This is done at least cost to efficiency 
by setting the money price at the low wage outlet high enough that the resulting queue 
is the minimum necessary to keep high wage earners out of the outlet.  The money price 
at the high wage outlet is set high enough to clear that outlet without queuing.  
  To evaluate the cost in efficiency of achieving specific egalitarianism under 
differential pricing, we consider next two plausible alternative mechanisms.  Each 
mechanism can (just) achieve specific egalitarianism as we have defined it, without 
requiring the government to identify the ability status of a given individual.  The first is 
uniform public provision of the target good, funded through a proportional income tax, 
with additional private purchase of g  allowed.  The second mechanism is uniform 
provision without private purchase, again financed through proportional taxation.  We 
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 then identify the conditions under which our mechanism can achieve the policy maker’s 
distributional goal more efficiently than the better of the alternatives. 
 
4.  Uniform Provision with Proportional Income Tax 
  Suppose that instead of differential pricing, the policy maker were to provide 
every individual with a uniform quantity of g, funded by a proportional income tax t on 
labour income.  This mechanism would additionally require the policy maker to know 
each individual’s total labour income, but not their individual ability or wage.  Along 
with public provision, individuals could be free to purchase additional units of g 
privately (as with school vouchers), or not (as with public health insurance in Canada).  
As we shall see, uniform provision funded by income tax replaces the inefficiency of 
queuing time and g price distortions with labour/leisure price distortions and under- or 
over-provision of the target good.  It will turn out that specific egalitarianism comes at 
a greater cost in efficiency when private purchase is allowed, because the government 
must provide sufficient g to crowd out all private purchases.  Our final comparison will 
be therefore between no-purchase uniform provision and differential pricing. 
4.1  Uniform Provision with Private Purchase 
 Returning  to  our  N-person economy, assume that the distribution of preferences 
and technology are the same as before.  The government will provide g % units of the 
target good to everyone.  An individual with θi relative strength of preference for g and 
with wage wj faces the problem:  
            ()
1/
,,
ˆ () i yg MaxU y g g
ρ ρρ ρ θ =+ + +
l
% l     
 s.t.    ˆ (1 ) j yg t w L +=− ,    
   L T += l    where  i=R or S and  j = L or H.      (12) 
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 Of relevance here, an individual’s supplementary demand function for   on top of  ˆ g g %  
is 






(1 ) (1 ((1 ) ) )
ˆ
















−− + − ⎜⎟
=⎜
⎜⎟ +− + ⎝⎠
%
⎟     i=R or S and  j = L or H.    (13) 
Note from (13) that there is a quantity of  g %  that would just crowd out the individual’s 
private purchase of . It can easily be shown that this quantity is rising in both w and θ, 
or that   and 
ˆ g
ˆ /0 j gw ∂∂> ˆ / i g 0 θ ∂∂> .  As we show in Appendix 3, a policy maker 
wishing to ensure specific egalitarianism in g will find it necessary to set the level of 
uniform provision at the “highest common denominator,” or at the level desired by an 
individual with the highest wage and strength of preference for the target good.   
Otherwise, private purchases by those with higher incomes will prevent the 
equalization of average consumption across wage groups.  From the numerator of (13), 
uniform provision must then satisfy 




















%           (14) 
Note that by providing g at a uniform level and crowding out private purchase, the 
policy maker only weakly satisfies specific egalitarianism.  Consumption across income 
groups will be equalized, but individuals with a high need for the good will receive the 
same amount as those with a low need, rather than more.      
            With no private purchase of g, an individual’s remaining demand functions are 
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.          (15) 
With crowding out, the leisure and consumption choices of individuals become 
independent of their strength of preference for g.  Substituting these demands functions 
into utility yields corresponding indirect utilities, 
** 1
,,, , () ij ij ij i ij Vy g
/ ρ ρρ θ =+ + % l
ρ
. 
  The policy maker must choose a tax rate and uniform provision of  g %  to solve: 
,, , , (1 ) (1 ) LR L LS L HR H HS H tg , MaxSW s N V sN V s N V sN V =− + +− +
%        (16) 






















⎟             ( 1 7 )  
 () L L LH H H LH Nt wL Nt wL N N g += + %            ( 1 8 )  
  (17) is necessary for specific egalitarianism and (18) is the government budget 
balance.  With private markets operating only for y and all prices but t given, a resource 
constraint is redundant, and the exact allocation of labour across G and Y production is 
under-identified as before.  Intuitively, the solution to the policy maker’s problem will be 
an optimal tax rate t
* that supports the minimum level of uniform provision that just 
crowds out all private purchase, or the (t
* g %
* ,  ) that satisfy (17) and (18) with equality.     
* g %
4.2  Uniform Provision without Private Purchase 
  Achieving specific egalitarianism comes at a high cost in efficiency under the 
above mechanism, because the government must impose on everyone the tax/provision 
trade-off that would be chosen by the keenest, wealthiest individual.  This inefficiency 
could be reduced if the policy maker could restrict private purchase of g, and provide 
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 instead an “average” amount g  to all at a lower tax rate.  With no possible purchase of g, 
an individual with  i θ  and  j w  would face the problem:  
            ()
1/
, i y MaxU y g
ρ ρρ ρ θ =+ +
l l     
 s.t.    (1 ) j yt w =− L ,    
   L T += l    where  i=R or S and  j = L or H.             (19) 
 
The individual’s demand functions for leisure and the composite commodity would be 
identical to those in (15), leading again to indirect utility 
** 1
,,, , () ij ij ij i ij Vy g
/ ρ ρρ θ =+ + l
ρ
. 
Now, since everyone must consume an identical g, the policy maker will automatically 
(weakly) satisfy specific egalitarianism, whatever the level of provision.  The policy 
maker will choose t and g to solve: 
,, , , (1 ) (1 ) LR L LS L HR H HS H tg , MaxSW s N V sN V s N V sN V =− + +− +           (20) 
 
 subject  to 
  ( L L LH H H LH Nt wL Nt wL N N g += + )                 ( 2 1 )  
The technical conditions are satisfied to ensure that one or more (
* g , ) pairs exist that 
solve this problem, and can be compared to find a global maximum.
* t
10  With no binding 
distributional constraint corresponding to (17), the social welfare resulting under this 
pair will be at least as high as that where private purchase was allowed.  Intuitively, the 
policy maker will choose the g/t tradeoff that would be chosen by the average person, 
weighted by the distribution of wage and preference strengths in the population.   
Because social welfare will be at least as high without private purchase, we shall 
concentrate on this case for the purpose of comparison with differential pricing.   
4.3  Comparing Policies 
          Ideally,  we  would  like  to  make a global comparison of social welfare when 
specific egalitarianism is achieved using differential pricing vs. uniform provision 
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 without private purchase.  That is, we would like to compare 











(, ) ij ij
iR SjL H
NV gt
== ∑ ∑ .                    (22) 
Such a comparison is complicated by the fact that we cannot in general derive closed 
form solutions for policy variables.  We can, however, derive closed form solutions and 
make comparisons when the elasticity of substitution between goods, ρ, is zero (Cobb-
Douglas).  We then rely on simulations to compare policies for other values of ρ. 
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There are closed form solutions for the Pg,j in (24), which take the simple form Pg,H = 
pH = N/NH, and Pg,L = wLhL + 0 = wL(pH-0)/wH =wLN/wHNH..  Note that with a Cobb-
Douglas degree of substitution, the low wage outlet will charge a zero price and rely 
completely on queuing to deter high wage individuals.
11   
  In contrast, under uniform provision the policy maker’s optimal choice of g and 
t become: 
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 We can now identify the variables that determine which policy achieves higher social 
welfare. 
4.3.1  The Importance of the Target Good  
  The first variable of interest is θ, the relative weight that individuals place on 
the target good relative to other goods.  To simplify the comparison, we assume 
initially that preferences for g are homogeneous at θ, and later consider the effect of a 
mean preserving spread.  As we show in Appendix 4, differential pricing will achieve 
specific egalitarianism more efficiently than uniform provision if and only if θ and 
wage disparity are related as follows: 
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+ − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
As proven in the Appendix, for a given ratio of high to low wages, the right hand side 
of the inequality in (27) is falling in θ.  Thus, for a given wage disparity, differential 
pricing will generate higher social welfare than uniform provision if θ is sufficiently 
high.  That is, there will exist a θ
* at which the policies yield equal welfare, and above 
which differential pricing will dominate.  Intuitively, this is because the tax rate needed 
to support uniform provision rises in θ more rapidly than do changes in the relative 
price of g across outlets.  As a result, as θ rises, uniform provision creates more 
substantial distortions to labour supply and consumption decisions than differential 
pricing when compared against a benchmark of no redistribution. 
4.3.2  Disparities in Wage and the Proportion of Low Ability Individuals 
  The second two variables of interest are the degree of wage disparity and the 
proportion of low ability individuals in the population.  Returning to (26), it is clear that 
differential pricing becomes more efficient than uniform provision as the ratio of high 
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 to low wage increases, or as the proportion of low ability individuals falls, all else 
constant.  Intuitively, less queuing time and target good price distortions are required to 
keep high wage individuals out of the low wage outlet as relative wage differentials 
grow, or as fewer individuals need to be subsidized, thus raising the relative efficiency 
of differential pricing to uniform provision.     
4.3.3  Disparities in Preference 
  The next variable of interest is the degree of variation in taste for g relative to 
other goods.  As we show in Appendix 5, when ρ = 0 any mean preserving spread in θR 
and  θS around θ
* makes differential pricing more efficient than uniform provision.  
Intuitively, preference heterogeneity favours differential pricing over uniform provision 
because the importance of allowing unequal consumption of g grows. Under uniform 
provision heterogeneous individuals must pay the same tax, receive the same g, and so 
choose identical labour/leisure and composite consumption. 
4.3.4  The Elasticity of Substitution Between Goods   
  Our final variable of interest is the elasticity of substitution that individuals hold 
between goods.  We cannot make general welfare comparisons between policies for 
values of ρ other than zero, because we cannot derive closed form solutions for the 
optimal policy instruments.  However, simulations under diverse parameters show that 
as individuals grow less willing to substitute other goods for the target good, 
differential pricing yields higher social welfare than uniform provision.  Our partial 
intuition for this is as follows. Under a high elasticity of substitution, low wage 
individuals take far more leisure under tax-funded uniform provision than differential 
pricing, because income tax discourages work effort, and because they need not spend 
time queuing for g.   With little difference in g or y consumption between mechanisms, 
the poor are thus better off under uniform provision.  As the elasticity of substitution 
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 drops, however, the poor lose the “leisure premium” under uniform provision, and 
receive noticeably less g.  This is because the policy maker must offer a negative price 
(subsidy) at the low income outlet as ρ →  −∞ to compensate low income individuals 
for the long waiting time required to keep high income individuals out of the outlet.  
These subsidies encourage the poor to consume more g and leisure, while still 
purchasing y.  The poor thus become better off under differential pricing.  
  High wage individuals face a reverse welfare ranking.  Under a high elasticity 
of substitution, they receive a “y premium” under differential pricing, with little 
difference in the other goods.  This is because differential pricing raises the price of g, 
providing substitution incentives towards y, and because the income tax under uniform 
provision discourages labour that makes y affordable.  The rich thus prefer differential 
pricing when ρ is high.  Once ρ drops, however, the rich lose the “y premium” under 
differential pricing, and purchase more g.  It appears that the large price differential for 
g set by the policy maker to ensure separation as ρ falls is not sufficient to turn the rich 
from purchasing g to purchasing y.  Thus the rich become better off under uniform 
provision.  Despite the asymmetry in welfare rankings for the rich and poor, overall 
social welfare rankings of the policies track those for the poor, because of a diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption.  Thus differential pricing becomes socially preferable 
as the elasticity of substitution falls. 
  We illustrate the preceding results in simulations in Figure 2.  In window (a), 
we show that a high value of (uniform) θ favours differential pricing.  In the simulation 
we have selected a wage ratio (5.4 to 1) that makes the two policies equivalent in 
welfare at θ
* = 1. In window (b), we illustrate how changing people’s elasticity of 
substitution between goods away from ρ = 0 affects the relative efficiency of the two 
policies.  The results are illustrated with homogenous preferences, a wage ratio of 5.4  
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Figure 2:   
Simulations for NH = NL = 100, sL = sH = .5, T = 24, wL = 1, wH = 5.4, θ
* = 1. 
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 to 1, and value of θ that makes the policies welfare equivalent when ρ = 0. A low value 
of ρ favours differential pricing. 
  As window (c) illustrates, an increase in the wage disparity ratio from 5.4 to 15 
increases the range in ρ over which differential pricing dominates uniform provision, 
while a decrease from 5.4 to 3 reduces it.
12  Finally, window (d) illustrates that the 
introduction of mean-preserving heterogeneity in relative taste for g, from θ
* = 1 to θR 
= .5 and θS = 1.5, also increases the range in ρ over which differential pricing 
dominates uniform provision.   
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
  In this paper, we have considered how a policy maker could achieve specific 
egalitarianism, making the consumption of a good “essential to life or citizenship”   
independent of income, but increasing in relative strength of preference or need.  We 
have assumed that good in question cannot feasibly be on-sold, and that the policy 
maker’s information is limited to the distribution of wages and preference strengths in 
the population, and not the earnings ability of any individual.
13  The policy maker 
would be exclusive purchaser of the good of interest from competitive producers, and 
then make it available at outlets charging different money and time prices.  A below-
cost money price at one outlet would be accompanied by a positive time price, which 
would be set just high enough to make high wage individuals better off purchasing the 
good at the higher price outlet with no wait.  These prices could be set to ensure that 
consumption of the target good was equalized across wage groups, while within wage 
groups, those who valued the good more would purchase more of it.   
  Redistribution by differential pricing carries the efficiency cost of alterations to 
relative prices, and time lost in queues that is not transferred to sellers.  However, we 
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 show that this efficiency cost may be less than that under more conventional policies, 
such as uniform provision financed by proportional income taxation, with or without 
private purchase.  For income tax also distorts relative prices, and uniform provision 
ignores differences in relative preferences for the target good.  Allowing optional 
private purchase to accompany uniform provision actually makes specific 
egalitarianism more costly to achieve, because the policy maker must tax and spend 
enough to crowd out all private purchases of the target good. 
  Even without private purchase, we find that uniform provision is likely to be a 
more costly way to achieve specific egalitarianism than differential pricing as 1) the 
relative importance of the target good rises, 2) the elasticity of substitution between the 
target good and other goods falls, 3) heterogeneity of preference for the target good 
rises, and 4) wage inequality increases or the proportion of the poor falls.  Furthermore, 
uniform provision satisfies specific egalitarianism in letter but not in spirit, as 
consumption of the target good does not strictly increase in strength of need.     
  We note that real world examples of differential pricing, whether in health care, 
highway and ferry tolls, hiking permits, postal services, or immigration processing offer 
at most a few price/time combinations.  This despite the fact that incomes (and abilities) 
follow a wide distribution.   Nonetheless, with judicious use, even a few money/time 
price combinations will greatly diminish the disparity of income of individuals per 
outlet, and thus the inequality of consumption caused by such disparity.  
  Our proposal suffers from several limitations.  First, as Nichols et al. (1971) 
observed, the existence of non-labour income uncorrelated with wage raises the 
possibility that, e.g., wealthy retirees might choose outlets targeted to the poor.  Second, 
the static nature of our model precludes its application to goods whose relative value to 
an individual would depreciate during the delay of optimal queuing time, such as acute 
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 surgery.  Perhaps most importantly, as mentioned earlier, our mechanism was modelled 
with the restrictive assumption that the distribution of preferences for the target good 
was identical across income groups.  Our mechanism still functions when the 
distribution of tastes diverges by income, but two problems emerge as this divergence 
grows.  First, the distributional requirement that consumption be equalized across 
income groups (6a) will begin to penalize individuals in income groups with a higher 
proportion of strong preference for the good.  Adjusting the equalization requirement to 
account for each income group’s relative s could address this problem, but may 
jeopardise the second distributional requirement (6b) that consumption of g be non-
decreasing in relative strength of preference, regardless of income.  A second problem 
as s diverges across income groups is that the existence of feasible prices with a non-
negative queuing time for low wage individuals can no longer be guaranteed.  In 
particular, as the disparity in s across wage groups increases, our mechanism’s 
tolerance for extreme disparities between strong and weak preference or relative size of 
wage groups is reduced.
14         
  With these caveats in mind, we have provided a mechanism that can achieve 
specific egalitarianism without compulsory queues or income or ability tests, while 
respecting differences in people’s relative preferences or needs. 
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 Appendix 1 
Proof that Individuals are Best Off Choosing the Outlet with the Lowest Full Price.  
 
We claim that an individual will choose the target good outlet that offers the lowest full 
price given his wage.  (He adjusts his time allocation between work and queuing 
accordingly). 
Proof: from (4), an individual’s indirect utility function is 
** * 1 /
, () ij i Vy g
ρ ρρ θ =+ + l
ρ  =  
11
11 1 1
, (1 ) gj i j j Pw w
ρρ ρ
ρρ ρ ρ ρ θ
−
−− − − ++ T
ρ
      
                                                         where i = R or S,   and j = L or H   (A.1) 
It follows that for any ρ ∈(-∞,1) 
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Appendix 2 
Proof that the allocation of labour hours across production sectors is under-identified. 
 
Define by αi,j the proportion of individual i,j’s total chosen labour hours devoted to 
production in the Y sector. For any arbitrary set of αi,j , total production of G and Y is 
given by  
,, , , , , ,
,, ,, ,,
(1 ) ij j ij ij ij j ij ij ij j ij
i RSj LH i RSj LH i RSj LH
Nw L Nw L Nw L αα
== == ==












ij j ij ij ij
iR SjL H



























⎟                                                (A.3) 
  26 
 ,, , , , , ,
,,
[] [ ( 1 ) ] [ ( 1 ) ij ij j ij H H RH SH L L RL SL
iR SjL H
N g p y N p s g sg N p s g sg
==
=+ = − + + − ∑∑ ] +
,
 
  +   ,, , [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] H RH SH L RL SL Ns y s yNs y s y −+ + −+     (A.4) 




[] ( ( 1 ) ) , H HL L R j S j i j i
iR SjL H
Np Npg s g s g Ny
==












[] H L i ji j i ji j i ji j
iRSjLH iRSjLH iRSjLH
NN g N y N g N y
== == ==
=+ + = + ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑ .   (A.5) 
 
Appendix 3 
Proof that for the policy maker to achieve specific egalitarianism, it is both necessary 
and sufficient to crowd out all private purchase of g. 
 
Sufficiency: 
Define as  the level of uniform provision that would crowd out private purchase by 
an individual of preference type i and wage j.  From the rhs of (14) it can be shown that 
 and 
, ij g %
, /0 ij j gw ∂∂ > % , / ij i g 0 θ ∂∂ > % .  It follows that if  g %  is set high enough to crowd out 
the maximum , namely  , ij g % g % ≥ , every individual will consume only , SH g % g % , (or set 
= 0)  and both (6a) and (6b) will be weakly but trivially satisfied.  , ˆij g
Necessity: 
We show that under all possible cases,  g %  must be set ≥   or else (6a) or (6b) will be 
violated. From 
, SH g %
, / ij j gw 0 ∂ ∂> %  and  , / ij i g 0 θ ∂ ∂> % it follows that   and  , RL RH gg < %% ,
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 , SL SH gg < %% , , . As well, from (13) it can be shown that    , ˆˆ RL RH gg <  and   for 
any positive  . 
, ˆˆ SL SH gg < ,
,
, ˆij g
Case I:   .  ,, , RL RH SL SH gggg <≤ < %%%%
If  g % ≤   then the lhs of (6a) will be (1-s)( , RL g % g % + )+s( , ˆRL g g % + ), and the rhs will be    , ˆSL g
(1-s)( g % + )+s( , ˆRH g g % + ).  Since  > , ˆSH g , ˆRH g , ˆRL g
  and  > , average 
consumption across the two wage groups will not be equal. 
, ˆSH g , ˆSL g
If   , RL gg < % %≤   then the lhs of (6a) will be (1-s) , RH g % g % + s( g % + ), and the rhs will be   , ˆSL g
(1-s)( g % + )+s( , ˆRH g g % + ).  Again, since
 
, ˆSH g , ˆ 0 RH g ≥ and  > , equality 
will not hold. 
, ˆSH g , ˆSL g
If  , RH gg < % %≤   then the lhs of (6a) will be (1-s) , SL g % g % + s( g % + ) and the rhs will be   , ˆSL g
            (1-s) g % + s( g % + ) , ˆSH g . Equality will not hold. 
If  , SL gg < % % <   then (6a) reduces to  , SH g % g % <(1-s) g % + s( g % + ), or inequality.  , ˆSH g
If  , SH g ≤ % g % , then (6a) reduces to  g % = g % .  Only here is equality satisfied for any s and  
            (6b) is (weakly) satisfied. 
 
Case II:   ,,, RL SL RH SH gggg <<< %%%% ,  . 
If  g % ≤   then the lhs of (6a) will be (1-s)( , RL g % g % + )+s( , ˆRL g g % + ), and the rhs will be    , ˆSL g
(1-s)( g % + )+s( , ˆRH g g % + ).  Since  > , ˆSH g , ˆRH g , ˆRL g
  and  > , average 
consumption across the two wage groups will not be equal. 
, ˆSH g , ˆSL g
If  g % ≤   then the lhs of (6a) will be (1-s) , SL g % g % + s( g % + ), and the rhs of (6a) will be             , ˆSL g
(1-s)( g % + )+s( , ˆRH g g % + ).  Since  >0 , ˆSH g , ˆRH g
  and  > , average 
consumption across the two wage groups will not be equal. 
, ˆSH g , ˆSL g
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 If  , then the lhs of (6a) reduces to  , SL RH gg g ≤< %% % , g % , and the rhs of (6a) will be  
(1-s)( g % + )+s( , ˆRH g g % + ).  Since  >0 , ˆSH g , ˆRH g
  and  >0, average consumption 
across the two wage groups will not be equal. 
, ˆSH g
If  , then using (6a),  , RH SH gg g ≤< %% % , g % <(1-s) g % +s( g % + ), or consumption will not be   , ˆSH g
equalized across wage groups.  
If  , SH g ≤ % g % .  Only here is consumption equalized across wage groups and (6b) is  
           (weakly) satisfied. 
 
Appendix 4 
Derivation of the condition for a welfare comparison between differential pricing and 
uniform provision when preferences are homogeneous.   
 
Assuming that  wH = awL, where  , then under either policy,  1 a ≥
,
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.   We show that a monotonic transformation, lnz, is rising in θ. 
2
ln 1





=+ − + − .                      (A.11) 
We consider the sign of (A.11) when θ → 0, 0<θ<2, and 2≤θ. 
As θ → 0, by L’hopital’s rule, 
0
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For 0<θ<2, from (A.11) ln(2+θ)-ln(1+θ)>ln(2+θ)-ln(4), so 
ln dz
dθ
>0.      






Derivation of the welfare comparison between differential pricing and uniform 
provision when preferences are heterogeneous 
 
In the special case where ρ = 0, optimal prices adjust under differential pricing such 
that   and  .  Then, just as under uniform provision, 
**
, RL RH gg = , ,
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The two expressions
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 , i = R or S, and θ
* is that weight on the target 
good that for a given wage disparity made the two policies welfare equivalent under 






θ + + ) H , differential pricing achieves higher social welfare than 
uniform provision if and only if 
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where 
1 1
2 2 [] / [
S R
LH LH NaN NaN
θ θ δ
+ + =+ + ≤ ] 1 .   We proceed by showing that the left 
hand side of (A.17) is increasing in a mean-preserving spread in preferences around 
* θ , 
starting from efficiency equivalence under homogeneity. 
  With the distribution of preferences identical across income groups, a mean 
preserving spread from
* θ can be defined as 
* (1 ) RS ss θ θθ − += , where 
*
R θ θ ≡− ε , and 
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≡≡ + ε .  Thus a decrease in heterogeneity can be represented 
by  0 ε → , and an increase by 
* ε θ → .  Focusing on AR and AS in A.17,  
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* ε . Since both  / i A ε ∂ ∂  are monotonically 
increasing, it follows that the partial derivative of the left hand side of (A.17) with 
respect to ε  will be minimized at ε  = 0. It can be shown that the evaluated value of the 
derivative at ε  = 0 is zero. Initial increases inε <
* ε  lower the relative utility that 
differential pricing delivers to regular strength individuals, but this is outweighed by 
higher relative utility gained by strong preference individuals.  Differential pricing thus 
raises overall social welfare over uniform pricing.  For 
* ε ε ≥ , individuals with both 
preference strengths gain welfare from differential pricing relative to uniform 
provision.  
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1 This section draws heavily on our earlier paper (Clark and Kim (2004)), that focuses exclusively on the 
re-distributional properties of differential money/time pricing. 
 
2 Our preferences over 3 goods are more general than in Alexeev and Leitzel (2001), who assume equal 
weight Cobb Douglas preferences between a single good and leisure.  We are less general, however, than 
O’Shaugnessy (2000), who assumes general concave utility, though also between one good and leisure. 
 
3  We adopt the convention of lower case letters for demand, and upper case letters for supply. 
 
4   We assume that individuals must queue once per unit purchased, and that everyone in a given outlet 
will wait an identical period of time per unit purchased.  This is a common way of modeling the time cost 
of queuing (Barzel (1974), Sah (1987), Suen (1989), Polterovich (1993), O’Shaughnessy (2000) and 
Alexeev and Leitzel (2001)).   Alternatives have been proposed, such as queuing time depending on 
show-up time (Holt and Sherman (1982)), or fixed time costs for any quantity of purchase (Weitzman 
(1991)).  
 
5  We assume the policy maker can successfully prevent a black market in G from forming directly 
between producers and individual buyers.  Alternatively, the government could allow private firms to sell 
G directly to individuals, offering a subsidy to those who sell at a prescribed below-market price, and 
taxing those who sell it at market price. 
 
6  A single resource constraint (for g) is sufficient because two of the three prices in the model have 
already been determined.  Alternatively, the resource constraint for y will be identical at market clearing 
prices. 
 
7 However allocated between G and Y production, labour hours supplied can be represented as a function 
of full price Pg,j via each individual’s time constraint, T- -hg.   By (6a), Pg,L can further be written as an 
increasing function of Pg,H,, such that the entire resource constraint can be written as a function of Pg,H. 
Uniqueness of full price is then satisfied in that the entire expression is monotonically decreasing in Pg,H, 
with infinite excess demand at zero price, and finite excess supply at infinite price.   
 
8 As drawn, the “isoprice” lines for high and low ability individuals cross in the positive quadrant, so that 
the time and money prices for low ability individuals are both positive.  In cases where ρ < 0 the 
intersection may occur at a positive time price, but negative money price (or subsidy).  See Clark and 
Kim (2004) for further details. 
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9  One plausible feasible allocation of labour across sectors would be for everyone to work in the 
production of Y in proportion to his or her expenditures on y out of total expenditures. 
   
 
10 The constraint (21) is closed, and the objective function (20) is bounded for all values contained in the 
constraint.  
 
11  Less willingness to substitute would require greater queuing time and a negative money price at the 
low wage outlet.  Greater willingness would require less queuing time and a positive money price. 
  
12   Whilw we do not illustrate it, we get analogous results if the wage disparity remains at 5.4, and we 
reduce NL/NH from 1 to 1/3, or raise it to 3.  A decrease in the proportion of the poor increases the range 
of ρ over which differential pricing achieves specific egalitarianism more efficiently than unform 
provision. 
 
13   Our alternative policies relying on income tax also require knowledge of each person’s total income. 
 
14   For example, when ρ = 0, wL = 1 and wH  = 5.4, all possible combinations of sL and sH are feasible 
when NL/N = NH/N = .5 and θS = 1.5 and θR = .5.  If, however, NL/N = .9 and NH/N = .1, then if sH = 1,  
sL must exceed .083 for hL to be non-negative.  Or returning to the baseline, if θR = .1 and θS = 1.9, then if 
sH = 0, sL cannot exceed .476 for hL to be non-negative. 
 
15  A detailed proof is available from the authors upon request. 
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